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ABSTRACT 
 
This study monitored the intelligence and foreign policy actions of Israel, Iran, 
and Saudi Arabia from August 2013 to August 2014. Data was collected from coverage 
by Associated Press, The Wall Street Journal, and Al-Jazeera, three reliable and respected 
news sources that cover global events. The actions taken by foreign policymakers in these 
countries were recorded throughout the study period.  
These actions were organized into a taxonomy based on whether they were 
intelligence-based or non-intelligence based. Within those broad categories, more 
distinguishing characteristics were analyzed to show patterns of behavior within national 
intelligence services of the nations studied. These patterns show a lot about how these 
nations approach diplomacy and national security. 
Conclusions were drawn with respect to these nations' intelligence communities 
by focusing through the lenses of comparative religion, economic considerations, colonial 
background, and cold war history. By concentrating on the socioeconomic environment 
behind these foreign policy actions, political scientists and policymakers can more 
completely analyze foreign affairs, particularly in the Middle East, and can make more 
valuable contributions to the global intelligence community and to cultural understanding 
between nations. 
 
Key Terms: foreign policy, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Intelligence, spies, global affairs, 
Middle East 
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INTRODUCTION 
Spies, by their nature, are illusive. Intelligence communities and the Middle East 
are both the frequent subjects of romance novels, action movies, and conspiracy theories. 
In this paper, the two will be combined in an academic light. Foreign policy and 
particularly intelligence has sociopolitical, economic, and historical influences and 
ramifications that, if analyzed, may tell a lot about the politics and culture of a nation. 
This study will monitor the intelligence and foreign policy actions of three Middle 
Eastern countries from August 2013 to August 2014 and draw conclusions about their 
intelligence communities by focusing through the lenses of comparative religion, 
economic considerations, colonial background, and Cold War history. The nations 
studied will be Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel. 
It is important to note that this study will be using the actions of these nations, as 
opposed to the decisions (which may not be properly executed) or the news coverage 
thereof. While the intentions of policymakers and the news coverage of events are 
important and will be used as analytical considerations, the actual data is the event itself. 
This study compares the historical and economic backgrounds of the nations 
studied to their modern foreign policy decisions. What makes this study truly different 
from scholarly work so far is its focus on intelligence communities within those nations. 
This emphasis on intelligence communities serves to limit the study for the sake of 
brevity, as well as provide more concrete analysis on the topic of Middle Eastern 
intelligence than is currently available to readers without a security clearance. 
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Little research has been done specifically on Middle Eastern intelligence 
communities and how these communities are involved in the foreign affairs of the nations 
that they serve. It is therefore the purpose of this research to deduce through current 
international news the involvement of intelligence work in foreign policy decisions in the 
Middle East region. 
 The second goal is to analyze why these agencies have the roles that they do. 
This analysis will employ the background information of religious predisposition and 
recent history to offer some explanation for the decision-making processes behind the 
actions that will unfold in the next year. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel were chosen 
because how little those nations have in common. Israel is a Jewish state that was inserted 
into the region mostly by European influence; Saudi Arabia has a stable monarchy and a 
fundamentalist Wahhabi religious tradition; Iran has a Shia majority with mystical Sufi 
influence and a recent history of political turmoil and revolution. 
The purpose of the study is to improve scholarly understanding of the complicated 
nature of affairs in the Middle East. Without a knowledge of historical and religious 
differences between the countries, one can only make decisions based on the assumption 
that everyone is an American; that is, that any rational actor holds the same values and 
ideas of importance as the West. Though the study is written from an American 
perspective, its intention is not to serve U.S. foreign policy goals, but rather to analyze 
the actions of the nations studied for a better global understanding. 
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METHODOLOGY  
PROCEDURE 
The foreign policy decisions and actions of the nations studied (Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and Israel) were monitored over a period of 13 months from August of 2013 to 
August of 2014. The data for the study was collected from the Wall Street Journal, the 
Associated Press, and Al Jazeera English. That data was cross-referenced and analyzed to 
find references to the intelligence networks that were involved in the events.  
From there, the analysis will look at sociopolitical, historical, and economic 
factors at work in the nations studied. This study aims to analyze some of the political 
reasons for and ramifications of the actions of Middle Eastern foreign policymakers and, 
by extension, intelligence operatives involved in those events. The work of the 
intelligence communities will be categorized and analyzed according to criteria designed 
to separate significantly different activities. 
Table 1: Methodology Process 
Data Collection Al Jazeera Wall Street Journal Associated Press 
Coding and Quantitative Analysis Data consolidates into events based on related actions Actions and reactions to each event are coded 
Qualitative Findings Cold War Imperialism Economics Religion 
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CRITERIA OF QUANTITATIVE NALYSIS 
Each reference to intelligence-related activity will be categorized according to 
emerging patterns. Three basic patterns are expected. 
CAPTURED HOSTILE PERSONNEL 
 Hypothetically, a captured Iranian spy held in Mossad custody could provide 
valuable information that would change Israeli foreign policy. Such activities would be 
classified in this category. 
DATA COLLECTED SURREPTITIOUSLY FROM FOREIGN SOIL 
 For example, photos taken at the Israel-Syria border that show Israeli troop 
movement could inspire Iran, Syria’s ally, to take action. Stolen documents, artifacts, 
photos, or other physical but non-human evidence would be classified here. This is 
expected to be prevalent if spy drones are widely used. 
PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS 
 Saudi Arabian intelligence services’ efforts to train Syrian rebels in military 
operations would be considered a paramilitary action, as would, for instance, an Iranian 
operative’s attempted assassination of a Saudi Arabian prince. 
Other foreign policy decisions may not directly involve intelligence communities. These 
events will also be recorded and categorized as follows. 
• DIPLOMATIC STATUS MANIPULATION 
o Ending or forming ties with a nation or group; for example, President 
Rouhani calls President Obama to discuss an improvement of relations. 
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• WAR GAMES 
o Moving troops within or between countries or mobilizing any military 
forces, but without directly engaging in combat, will be categorized here. 
• MILITARY OPERATIONS 
o Any act of war or open violence between the nations studied will be 
categorized here. 
 
If patterns emerge from the recorded foreign policy actions of a specific country, 
or if the intelligence communities of each country seem to specialize in one or two of the 
categories, this taxonomy will be invaluable in creating a reliable picture of that nation’s 
intelligence culture and patterns. Further, this paper will try to analyze how that nation’s 
specialization can be tied to its religious, colonial, or economic, and/or Cold War 
background. 
DATA SOURCES 
The Associated Press is a syndicated global news network. It was chosen because 
its publication generally offers little analysis, which may distract from the data. An 
advantage of this publication is that is it not written by one nationality or political group 
of writers. The wide range of nationalities of its writers might make it more likely to 
cover stories that may not be covered by a predominantly American or Arab news outlet, 
for example. The variety of journalists working for AP may allow for a wider range of 
data to be collected. 
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The Wall Street Journal was chosen for its detailed global news section and 
attention to the Middle East. Prior to the study, the publication was known to have 
several reporters stationed in the area to provide first-degree accounts of events without 
relying on syndicated reports. The Journal offers a bit more analysis than the Associated 
Press, but not as much as most network news sources.  
Al-Jazeera English will be used because of its intensive coverage of Middle East 
politics. There are many stories that only Al-Jazeera tends to cover, and that makes it 
invaluable as a source of as much data as possible. The downside to Al-Jazeera is that the 
publication has largely Arab writers and editors, so it may be more likely to include 
biased accounts of, for example, Israeli wrongdoing in Gaza. This effect will be mitigated 
by the presence of Wall Street Journal, which tends to be geared towards U.S. 
conservatives, who will be more pro-Israel. 
Over 180 news articles were recorded over the course of the study that gave 
information about or attempted to analyze the intelligence or foreign policies of Iran, 
Israel, or Saudi Arabia. These were organized according to relevance, then categorized by 
date and topic into four major events: The Syrian civil war, Iran’s change in diplomacy, 
the Gaza War, and the rise of ISIL. 
These events are certainly not all-inclusive of everything that has happened in the 
Middle East over the past year, but many other important topics can be thought of as 
cohesive with this general timeline. 
After this quantitative analysis, the events, the foreign policy actions that make 
them up, and other nations’ reactions to them will be analyzed according to the 
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sociopolitical and economic backgrounds of those nations. Factors of religious identity, 
economics, cold war history and colonial history will be considered in an analysis to 
suggest causative cultural influences on the foreign policies of nations studied. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
SAUDI ARABIA 
Saudi Arabia is one of the most economically affluent Arab states in the modern 
Middle East. Its religious, conservative Wahhabi majority sees the centuries-old al-Sa’ud 
ruling family as legitimate because of the religious origin of the family’s rule. Revolt or 
offense against the monarchy would be a religious as well as political crime, as long as 
the family remains loyal to Wahhabi and Islamic sensibilities. Simultaneously, Saudi 
Arabia has been one of the friendliest states to Western oil interests because of the 
opportunistic capitalism that guides Saudi foreign policy towards the west. Saudi Arabian 
intelligence has been active in recent years with public cooperation with the US and a 
few somewhat-less-public “spy” 1 movements. 
WAHHABISM 
Saudi Arabia is home to a large concentration of Wahabi Muslims. Wahhabism, a 
subset of Sunni Islam, is founded on the teachings of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, who 
lived in the early 18th century in what is now Saudi Arabia. The name “Wahhabi” was 
given to the group by its detractors, and implies that the sect is not to be followed or 
trusted. 2 Followers of the sect instead refer to themselves as al-da’wa ila’l-tawhid, which 
translates to something like “Unitarian.”3  
                                                     
1 This study does not use the word “spy” to mean an employee or agent of a state’s 
intelligence service except when quoting this usage of the word by a news source.  
2 Most Western writers have used the word “Wahabi” in studies of the sect for its clarity 
and recognition with Western audiences, without any derogatory connotation. That is 
how it is intended here. 
3 George Rentz and Arberry, A. J. "The Wahhabis." Religion in the Middle East: three 
religions in concord and conflict. London: Cambridge U.P., 1969. V.2, pp 270-284. Print. 
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Wahhabism was inspired as a response to the common practice of “shirk,” or 
syntheism in other Muslim traditions of the time, such as that of Jaliyyah. This concept 
involves association of animals or objects with the divine, thereby making them seem 
artificially sacred. Al-Wahhab, who was theologically educated in Medina, saw this 
practice as heresy and idolatry, and considered those who engaged in it to be not Muslims 
at all. He instead preached the concept of “tawhid,” or unity.4 He stressed the 
omnipotence and uniqueness of God’s divine nature and the importance of avoiding any 
changes to doctrines and religious practices, in order to avoid heresies like syntheism. He 
instead sought to return to the Qur’an and Hadith to the exclusion of later teachings and 
additions to Islam. 
Muhammad al-Wahhab was known to say, “We, praise be to God, are followers, 
not innovators.”5 A study of the cultural and political implications of Wahhabism can be 
focused on its ritualistic traditionalism and resistance to change. These concepts are 
rooted in the fabric of the sect’s core teachings, but came to fruition during its period of 
Western influence and colonization. 
ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE 
In 1744, Muhammad al-Wahhab struck an agreement with a minor ruler named 
Muhammad Sa’ud, securing Sa’ud’s support of the new Wahhabi religious movement in 
exchange for promised political power.6 Muhammad Sa’ud’s successors continued to 
gain power and lands through military dominance and connection to the popular Wahhabi 
movement. The Sa’ud family seized Mecca and Medina from the Ottoman occupation, 
                                                     
4 Rentz, p. 271 
5 Rentz, p. 270 
6Rentz, p. 272 
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but was defeated by Egypt under Muhammad Ali in 1818.7  The family became 
important again in 1902 with Abd al-Aziz, commonly known as Ibn Sa’ud.  
Ibn Sa’ud was deeply religious. The only formal education he received was of a 
very staunchly traditional Wahhabi nature. However, he had a pragmatic view of non-
Wahhabi cultures and states because of his adolescence spent living in exile in Kuwait. 8 
During a time of global industrialization, Sa’ud was able to modernize without losing his 
domestic Wahhabi traditionalism (or at least the appearance of it). This pro-modernism 
allowed him to achieve military and diplomatic success even against global powers like 
Great Britain, which protected petroleum interests in the Arabian Peninsula with military 
force. In a campaign to evict British rule from the Arabian peninsula, Ibn Sa’ud called 
upon the religious loyalty of the Bedouin nomads, which represented a large portion of 
his military force.  
After the wars with the British, the militant Wahhabi Bedouins accused Ibn Sa’ud 
of practicing watered-down Wahhabism because of his restraint and discouragement of 
Bedouin “jihad” in the wars. They revolted against the king in 1928, but the rebellion was 
crushed. This rebellion and its end marked the transition from religious to more political 
goals in the Saudi monarchy. 
In 1932, Saudi Arabia was declared a consolidated state that would bear the name 
of King Ibn Sa’ud, the first in the still-ruling line of Al-Sa’ud rulers in the modern Saudi 
Arabian kingdom. The 1930’s brought the discovery of Saudi oil and its importance, and 
                                                     
7 Bowen, Wayne H. (2008). The History of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CN: Greenwood 
Press. p. 153 
8 Ibid. 
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the economy of Saudi Arabia profited immensely. It also brought a new tolerance for the 
Christian geologists who were coming from the West to seek oil. The oil industry and its 
incredible profitability forced the industrialization of a naturally revolution-resistant 
Wahabi culture, which in turn forced a change in Saudi society. The Wahhabis 
transitioned from a staunchly fundamentalist, religion-based society to one that is 
concerned with global economic and political affairs. 
The traditionalist fabric remained at the core of Saudi culture, so it was some time 
before domestic Saudi government caught up with its tolerant foreign policy. At the time 
of Ibn Sa’ud’s death in 1953, Saudi Arabia had no constitution, parliament, political 
parties, or bureaucracy.9 The al-Sa’ud family’s legitimacy was based on its 18th century 
pact with Muhammad al-Wahab, and the laws of the nation were Shari’ah in essence. 
In the mid-20th century, King Faisal instituted education and social welfare 
programs that created a Western-educated elite to staff the new bureaucracy. However, 
the new elite were excluded from the decision-making process, preserving the monarchial 
nature of the government’s core.  
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
A disconnect still exists between the tolerant, capitalistic nature of the al-Sa’ud 
royalty’s foreign policy towards the West and the fundamentalist Wahhabi source of its 
legitimacy. The ability to keep those spheres separate is itself a Western political idea, 
                                                     
9 Cleveland, William L., and Martin Bunton. "The Arabian Peninsula in the Petroleum 
era." A history of the modern Middle East. 5th ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2013. 
394-398. Print. 
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and probably stems from the British (or even Ottoman) overtones of its modern oil-based 
state. 
Saudi Arabia’s GDP was 748 billion USD in 2013, and 55% of that is a result of 
the oil market. Its economy is mostly oil-based.10 About 93% of Saudi budget revenues 
and 90% of its exports can be attributed to the energy sector.11 The country controls 
about 18% of the world’s proven oil reserves.12 Saudi Arabia has been trying to diversify 
its income with manufacturing, but most of the manufacturing laborers are immigrants 
from Africa. About 31% of the Saudi population is made up of non-nationals, and only 
15% of foreign workers are classified as skilled labor. Economists have noticed an ethnic 
hierarchy that determines the sort of job one may expect to find in Saudi Arabia, ranging 
from unskilled labor from Africa and the Indian subcontinent to Western or Arab skilled 
labor.13 The Saudi government wants Saudi people in these positions, but faces similar 
issues that the US government faces with immigration control and employment rates.14 
There are more educated, skilled Saudi Arabians than there are careers for 
educated and skilled people in Saudi Arabia. This makes skilled laborers one of the chief 
exports of Saudi Arabia, much to the government’s chagrin.15  
 The duality between Saudi Arabia’s ultra-religious domestic face and the 
petroleum-infused pragmatism of its foreign relations leads to some very complicated 
                                                     
10 "Data by Country: GDP (current US$)." The World Bank. n.p., n.d. Web. 12 Oct. 2014. 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>. 
11 "2012 Exports figures of Saudi Arabia". CIA World Factbook. 
12 "Saudi Arabia". OPEC. 1995-01-01. Retrieved 2014-10-08. 
13 Lytras, Miltiadis D. (2009). Knowledge Ecology in Global Business: Managing 
Intellectual Capital. pp. 7–8. 
14 "Saudi Arabia. Profile". 11/2001. US government. Retrieved 12 May 2014. 
15 Ibid. 
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foreign policy decisions for the al-Sa’ud family. However, in contrast to Iran, Arabia has 
the advantage of centuries-old monarchial tradition and the domestic power security to 
make unpopular decisions without fear of immediate domestic revolt from its ultra-
traditionalist population.16 This stability comes in handy to a country as economically 
influential as Saudi Arabia.  
RECENT FOREIGN POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY 
 Al-Mukhabarat al-Amaah, the Saudi intelligence service, has been active in the 
news in recent months. In spring of 2013, Saudi Arabian counterintelligence arrested a 
“foreign spy ring” of 18 suspected intelligence operatives. Most were Saudi Arabian 
nationals, but there were also one Lebanese and one Iranian in the roundup.17 The Saudi 
government’s willingness to publicly announce this discovery might be rather telling 
about who they considered to be their biggest political threats at the beginning of the 
study. Even more telling is with whom they openly cooperated: in February of 2013, the 
CIA used a Saudi Arabian military base as a literal launch pad for strikes against 
militants in Yemen.18 That instance is not unusual; the two agencies have over a decade 
of cooperation behind them dating back to September 11, 2001.19  
The impression given by recent events is that Saudi intelligence officials have the 
authority and ability to participate in paramilitary attacks, and that the foreign policies of 
                                                     
16 Obaid, Nawaf E. “In Al-Saud We Trust.” Foreign Policy No. 128 (Jan. - Feb., 2002), 
pp. 72-74 
17 Al Jazeera. "Saudi Arabia arrests 18 suspected spies." AJ English- Middle East. n.p., 
n.d. Web. 14 Oct. 2014.  
18 Al Jazeera. "CIA 'using Saudi base for drone strikes'." AJ English- Middle East. n.p., 
n.d. Web. 14 Oct. 2014.  
19 Grenier, Robert. "Misconceiving the intelligence war." AJ English- Opinion. n.p., n.d. 
Web. 14 Oct. 2014.  
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the current administration tend to be more pro-Western, either for political or economic 
reasons. 
As data on current foreign policy is gathered, it is important to realize Saudi 
Arabia’ s particular position in the Middle East. The leadership has an interest in playing 
up its sense of obligation to other Arab states in the region because of its affluence and 
reputation of religious conservatism.20 However, due to almost completely non-religious 
differences, it has rocky relationships with Yemen and Iraq, two Islamic states. The irony 
cannot be ignored that the religious tradition that gives the al-Sa’ud family its power is 
the same tradition that makes its policy decisions so complicated. 
  
                                                     
20 Kechichian, Joseph A. “Trends in Saudi National Security.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 
53, No. 2 (Spring, 1999), pp. 232-253. 
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IRAN 
Iran differs from many of its neighbors in that it is not Arab. The majority of the 
people of Iran are Persian by ethnicity and Shia Muslim by faith, and those two factors 
influence much of Iranian politics. In contrast to Saudi Arabia’s centuries-old royal 
lineage, Iran has seen revolution after revolution since its formation, and their foreign 
policy remains unpredictable. 
PERSIAN ISLAM 
Ancient Persia’s religious identity was originally Zoroastrian, a tradition that 
highly centralized angels, the moral nature of mankind, and the existence of an afterlife.21 
After the defeat of the Sasanid empire by Arab forces, the two religions existed together 
for more than two hundred years. The rise of Islam’s popularity in Iran was done 
gradually, and usually through conversion rather than force. 
The split between Sunni and Shia Islam had a great effect on Iranian spiritual 
identity. When Mohammed died, some of his followers believed that succession 
according to the Quran should be by consensus among Muslims, and wanted Abu Bakr, 
Mohammed’s father-in-law, to lead the Muslim community. This group became the 
foundation for the Sunni tradition. The Shia sect is a global minority, and is the result of a 
group of Mohammed’s followers who believed that only direct descendants of the 
prophet should succeed him. They wanted Mohammed’s son-in-law, Ali Ibn Abi Talib, to 
be the next leader, followed by Mohammed’s grandsons. 
                                                     
21 Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Arberry, A.J. "Ithna 'Ashari Shi'ism and Iranian Islam." 
Religion in the Middle East: three religions in concord and conflict. London: Cambridge 
U.P., 1969. 96-118. Print. 
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In early Islamic history, Iran was mostly Sunni, even though Shi’ism is of Persian 
origin. Shi’ism did not become the state religion of Iran until the establishment of the 
Safavid empire following the Mongol conquest of Persia. Shi’ism spread rapidly, again 
through evangelism more than force. Today Shi’ism dominates Iran except for areas such 
as Khurasan and Kurdistan. 22  
Sufism, a mystical sect of Islam, also influences Iranian religion significantly. The 
inner, most esoteric teachings of Sufism are reserved for those who have been qualified 
for their study; the movement is largely cloistered. However, Sufi poetry, music, and art 
have been raised to such a status as to make a significant mark on Persian culture. 
Shia spirituality is focused on the duality between Allah’s omnipotence and man’s 
obligation to free will. Mankind must choose the “right path” without compulsion. 
Another important concept is the transient nature of physical things. Persian culture is 
very much taken with art and literature, but recognizes that something beautiful can never 
be truly experienced again. Shia prayer commonly involves a musical chanting of the 
Qu’ran during which worshippers achieve a kind of trance that removes them from the 
worldly cares of life.23 The physical world, therefore, can bring Shia worshippers closer 
to a oneness with God, which is the ultimate goal of the spirituality. No part of the world 
surrounding a Shia Muslim can be ignored for its religious and divine significance. (This 
may sound rather at odds with the purist Wahhabi commitment against syntheism and 
idolatry.) However, Shi’ism is always pursued with a rueful acknowledgement that this 
goal can never be fully realized without divine intervention. Therefore, intermediaries are 
                                                     
22 Nasr, p. 100 
23Nasr, p, 103 
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needed between mankind and the divine: these mediators are the twelve Imams that 
succeeded the prophet Muhammad. These Imams are rather like saints, and devout Shia 
often pray to them for intercession.  
This focus on the leadership of holy men allows for religious judicial authorities 
like that of Ayatollah Khomeini, who led the 1979 Islamic revolution and established the 
current, religion-based Iranian government. 
COLONIALIZATION 
 Until the late 18th century, a family of religious Shia monarchs ruled Iran. The 
Qajar shahs based their religious validity on their piety and depth of learning rather than a 
natural divine nature. This was the first step away from a purely religion-based 
government in Iran. However, the rulings of the Mujtahids, religious judges headed by 
the Ayatollah (eye of God), were considered more valid than even those of the Shah. This 
is similar to the modern role of the Ayatollah over the president of Iran. 
 Iran was culturally stable in the 19th century, and avoided the European-inspired 
reforms that were being undertaken by Turkey and Egypt.24  Russia occupied territories 
claimed by Iran by the Caspian Sea, including parts of Azerbaijan. In 1828, Russia 
imposed the Treaty of Turkomanchai on Iran, which granted Russia economic rights of 
passage through Iranian waters and lowered tariff rates on trade between the nations. Iran 
was militarily unable to refuse, but the British challenged Russia’s influence by 
presenting their own very similar treaty with Iran in 1857. This allowed economic 
                                                     
24 Cleveland, William L., and Martin Bunton. "Egypt and Iran in the Late Nineteenth 
Century." A History of the Modern Middle East. 5th ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
2013. 103. Print. 
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competition between Britain and Russia on Iranian soil, which brought Iran into a global 
economy with cheap imports with which it could not compete. Iran would export raw 
materials and import manufactured goods from Europe. This meant that Iran would be 
unable to economically disentangle itself from Europe, giving both Britain and Russia a 
position of political power over the shah. 
COLD WAR IRAN 
The Cold War was an especially turbulent period for Iran. Reza Shah overthrew 
the Qajar regime in the early 1920’s with a British-supported coup d’état. He did much to 
modernize Iran during his 20 years of often-despotic rule, but was forced by the invading 
British military to abdicate the throne in 1941 because of his refusal to aid the Allies 
during WWII.25 His abdication thrust his son, Mohammed Reza Shah, into an insecure 
throne in Russian and British-occupied Tehran. The new ruler was forced to share power 
with several factions and political parties, which encouraged public disapproval of the 
monarch. When he was pressured into signing a domestically unpopular oil deal, the 
situation worsened.26 
 Growing sentiment against a Europe that was seen as taking economic advantage 
of Iran came to a tipping point in the early 1950’s, when Mohammed Mossadeq, a 
popular nationalist leader, convinced Iran’s legislative body to nationalize Iran’s oil 
resources.  The West responded with a boycott on Iranian goods. This effectively shut 
                                                     
25 Milani, Abbas. The Shah. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Print. 
26 Cleveland, William L., and Martin Bunton. "Democracy and Authoritarianism." A 
History of the Modern Middle East. 5th ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2013. 271-
279. Print. 
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down Iran’s oil income. Mossadeq became Prime Minister and continued to reform the 
Iranian government and remove power from the Shah, including that of the military, 
which weakened Iran’s defenses.  
Some of the military officers that had lost their positions in the reinvention of the 
military formed a secret plot in 1953 to overthrow the new leader. The U.S. provided CIA 
assistance, both to support British oil interest and to prevent the new Iranian government 
from steering the country toward the Soviet side of the Cold War. Mohammed Reza Shah 
was returned to power and fortified his throne with heavy-handed repression of dissent, 
enforced by his secret police, called SAVAK. SAVAK was known to abduct and torture 
Iranian nationals, which added to the mystique of fear and hate around the shah’s regime. 
To this day, public opinion in Iran detests and distrusts any attempt by the U.S. or 
Europe to change the course of Iranian governmental policy or any attempt by an Iranian 
leader to improve relations with the West. The Iranian people, who since the early 20th 
century had been unable to gain freedom from European involvement, were near to that 
goal until the U.S. and Britain interfered in the name of economic and Cold War gains.  
In 1979, the Islamic Revolution was lead by Ayatollah Khomeini, a strict 
religious cleric and public critic of the Shah who had been exiled to Europe. The Shah, 
dying of cancer, was overthrown and forced to flee the country. He was granted asylum 
in the United States. Because of this, the U.S. embassy was attacked and many of its 
employees were held hostage for 444 days in an event referred to as the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis. Since the revolution, Iran has been fairly secluded on a global scale, and has shut 
out contact with most other nations. 
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Ayatollah Khomeini’s government was based on the validity of his own religious 
power; the Ayatollah’s word is the ultimate source of law in Iran. The Revolutionary 
Guards to have taken the place of SAVAK as the secret police whose job it is to protect 
the Supreme Leader. However, Iran also has executive and legislative bodies that 
resemble those of the United States. These sources of law are underneath the authority of 
the Ayatollah. 
When Khomeini’s government shut the West out of Iran, diplomatic relations iced 
over for decades. Khomeini similarly alienated Arab allies with his message of religion-
based Shari’ah government and his wish to export his revolutionary ideas, leading many 
of them to side with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war.27 The West has viewed Iran as a threat 
since the Hostage Crisis, and the introduction of a nuclear program in Iran after the 
conclusion of the Cold War lead to even more strained relations. 
ECONOMIC CONCERNS 
Iran has a mixed economy with a strong reliance on its hydrocarbon resources, 
which include both oil and natural gas. Prior to this study, Iran did not have a large 
amount of trade with the West, though several companies have gained permission to look 
for oil in Iranian territory. Much of the government is centrally controlled28, and heavy 
taxation and regulation burden private ventures. Islamic organizations called Bonyads 
have until recently controlled about 20% of Iran’s GDP and are not taxed.29 The subsidy 
reform act passed in early 2010 was meant to replace sweeping subsidies on food and 
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energy with targeted social reform and to move the country towards market prices by 
2015.30 
Many economists expect Iran’s economy to improve with lessened government 
control and improved relations with the West. 31 If sanctions are lifted, the Iranian 
economy can be expected to improve drastically, very quickly.32 That may be a big “If,” 
though. The conservative, anti-west voices in Iran would prefer to improve Iran’s 
economy from within, and see any seeking of Western favor as a betrayal. 
FOREIGN POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIONS 
Iran had not until very recently warmed to any Western powers. Ayatollah 
Khomeini died and was succeeded by Khameini. The more radical President 
Ahmadinejad, who participated in the 1979 revolution as a student, was replaced in 2010 
by the comparatively moderate Rouhani, who began to make diplomatic appeals to the 
West, particularly the U.S. The effects of this dramatic change in policy are included in 
this study, as are the effects of Iran’s pride in its nuclear power program. 
The Ministry of Intelligence and National Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(MOIS in Farsi), Iran’s intelligence ministry, is a crucial and highly trusted source of 
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Web. 14 Oct. 2014.  
 
 
22 
information in Iran.33 It provides a security brief to all senior executives in the Iranian 
government each morning, just like the CIA.  
The MOIS has made headlines in recent years mostly for executing suspected 
spies caught on Iranian soil34or for allegations that it was behind a terrorist plot.35 Little 
is directly known about Iran’s intelligence actions, but the state-run Iranian media isn’t 
shy about disseminating stories (and plenty of corroborating evidence) to outlets like Al-
Jazeera about the strength of their Intelligence service and nuclear program. 
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ISRAEL 
Israel definitely stands out from its neighbors in the Middle East. It is Jewish by 
official religion and by overwhelming majority. Many non-practicing or non-religious 
Israelis would describe themselves as Jewish because of ethnic or other secular 
backgrounds. Many Israeli citizens moved to the country from Europe. The history of the 
state of Israel as we know it doesn’t even date before the 20th century. Instead of being 
constantly at odds with Western influence, Israel was created by the United Nations at the 
hand of countries like the U.S. and Britain. Most of Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbors 
don’t acknowledge the nation’s sovereignty or even its existence. 
ISRAELI JUDAISM 
Israel is made up of a collection of mostly European, mostly Jewish immigrants. 
Because of its patchwork of backgrounds and ethnic origins, the nation is home to a 
variety of sects of Judaism. The one common thread connecting most of the different 
subgroups is Zionism, the idea that Israel is the scriptural Jewish homeland and that the 
Israeli state has an ancient, lawful claim to and responsibility for the territory.36 
The Torah says that Israel has always been “a nation dwelling by itself, not 
counted among the peoples.”37 Many Jewish prayers and rituals have a central theme of 
returning to the homeland that God intended for his “chosen people.” While many Jewish 
communities see this call as a return to a closeness with God or a metaphorical home in 
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their faith, most Israeli Jews interpret this call to be a literal command to return to the 
area that was once held by the ancient Hebrew tribes. 
FORMATION OF ISRAEL 
The modern Zionist movement was popularized by the publication of Dr. Theodor 
Herzl’s Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) in Vienna in 189638. After the publication of 
that book, the Jewish communities in urban Europe began speaking in earnest of a Jewish 
homeland, particularly in the Middle East, in much more realistic terms. The idea was 
now less of a thought experiment and more of a political position. 
Anti-Jewish sentiment existed in Europe from before the Crusades, but World 
War I began a period of mass migration of Jews out of Eastern Europe. Many of them 
went to Vienna, New York, or London, but others went instead to Palestine. There, 
Jewish communities would commonly live in communes known as “kibbutzes,” which 
employed co-operative economic systems in small groups. The Balfour Declaration of 
1917 formalized the British support of a Jewish homeland, at least in theory.  
The provisions of the declaration began to materialize with waves of Jewish 
settlers in the region in the 20’s, but the state of Israel didn’t officially exist until after 
World War II. A new wave of Jewish refugees escaping Nazi persecution flooded 
Palestine. European sympathy for survivors of the Holocaust and desire to establish a 
state in the Middle East that was friendly to European interests inspired the U.N. to carve 
a Jewish state out of the occupied territory surrounding Jerusalem.  
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In 1948, U.N. Resolution 181 created the sovereign state of Israel. The U.S. and 
most European states immediately recognized the nation. Most Arab countries, however, 
viewed the Jewish settlement as another sort of European occupation that had to be 
ousted in order to achieve cultural and political independence from their colonial owners. 
Israel’s gradual military acquisitions of territory over the next decades only exacerbated 
the hostility and challenged the religious sentiment of the Muslims who also considered 
the land to be holy in their own tradition.  
20TH CENTURY ISRAEL 
This hostility was very apparent during and after the Yom Kippur War in 1973. 
Both sides of the war were thoroughly entrenched with Cold War superpowers: Israel 
with the United States and the Many Arab nations, such as Syria and Egypt, with the 
Soviet Union.  
Syria attacked the Golan Heights while Egypt launched an offensive across the 
Suez Canal, successfully crossing over to and maintaining the East bank.39 Anwar Sadat 
of Egypt did not wish to gain more territory than the eight miles of desert east of the Suez 
Canal. That was enough to secure the canal and regain the military image lost in Egypt’s 
defeat by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War that lost them the entire Sinai Peninsula. Israel’s 
defenses reclaimed the land that Egypt had gained in the first days of the conflict by 
launching an offensive during a cease-fire that was called for the Jewish holiday of Yom 
Kippur. They came within striking distance of Cairo, forcing Sadat to accept the cease-
fire arranged between U.S. and Soviet officials. 
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In 1978, Sadat and Manachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister, signed the Camp 
David Peace Accords that had been arranged by U.S. President James Carter. The 
following year, the two signed a formal peace treaty that normalized the relations 
between the two countries. Egypt, the Pan-Arab, nationalist stronghold of the Middle 
East, recognized the state of Israel and exchanged ambassadors with the Jewish nation. 
This move forever changed the dynamic between the two countries, as well as between 
Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. At the time of this writing, the only two Arab 
nations to recognize Israel’s sovereignty are Egypt and Jordan, which under King 
Hussein had friendly relations with Israel. 
ECONOMIC CONCERNS 
Israel has a highly developed market economy, which is made up of a diverse 
range of industries such as tourism, high technology, diamonds, and telecommunication. 
Its 2014 GDP was $286.840 billion USD. Large Israeli cities are similar in size and 
technology to those of Europe or the U.S. However, the ultraorthodox Haredi Jewish and 
Israeli Arab minorities, which make up about 25% of the population together, make up 
about 60% of Israel’s poverty.40 
Israel relies on OEPEC for economic support and Britain and the U.S. specifically 
for political support. Israeli officials will rarely have to choose between those two very 
necessary sources of stability in Israeli policy. 
MODERN FOREIGN POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE 
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 Egypt and Jordan are the only Middle Eastern states to have formally recognized 
Israel. This means that Israel lives in a constant state of wariness, especially in regards to 
Palestine, Iraq, and Iran. Israel has reported consistent rocket attacks launched from the 
Gaza Strip for some time41, where Palestinian refugees rebel against Israeli control of the 
land. The West Bank of the Jordan River is another contested territory with many 
Palestinian residents. While Israel certainly has the military power to take over the Gaza 
strip, it has avoided open confrontation or war with Palestine so far in an effort not to 
provoke the Arab Muslims on all sides who would tip the tides against Israel’s 
advantage.42 
Mossad, Hebrew for “Institution,” is the name of Israeli intelligence service. 
Mossad has claimed credit (or responsibility) for several assassinations, kidnappings, and 
other paramilitary operations of the Cold War, but recently has only been openly 
pursuing more subdued, modern tactics. Much of Mossad’s culture is based upon the CIA 
that originally trained it, but the main purpose of Mossad is the same as the main goal of 
Israeli foreign affairs in general: survival of the Jewish state.  
Israel has many unfriendly if not openly hostile neighbors. Many of those nations 
are bolstered by oil wealth, while Israel relies on European and American aid. Much of 
Israel’s foreign policy is built around intelligence and defense from hostile neighbors. It’s 
a simple foreign policy, but Mossad’s tactics could have drastic complications if it 
alienates Israel’s western allies. This, more than any changes in ideology, may be a 
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restraining factor to an intelligence community that would otherwise be given to brazen 
paramilitary operations. 
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DATA 
THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 
At the beginning of the data collection period, the war in Syria was front-page 
news every day. When allegations and photographs of the Assad regime’s use of 
chemical weapons surfaced online, the war gained international attention. 
Saudi Arabia wasted no time in forming a paramilitary operation (with CIA 
cooperation) to train and arm Syrian rebels.43 The CIA did not come through with the 
arms and help that the Saudi operation had expected, leading to intelligence chief Prince 
Bandar bin Sultan’s holding the U.S. at arm’s reach. “Saudi Arabia's intelligence chief 
said the kingdom would make a ‘major shift’ in relations with the U.S. in protest over its 
perceived inaction on Syria and its overtures to Iran44,” Al-Jazeera reported in late 
October. As the U.S. sought to improve relations with Iran by seeking to solve the 
problems of Syria without removing Assad, this divide worsened. Secretary of State John 
Kerry said that Bandar was “the problem,” and described him as erratic and hot-headed.45 
Bandar indicated that he would step up involvement in Syria, rather than ease off. 
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Israel's cabinet called 1,000 reservists to secure the Syrian border and canceled all 
home leave. 46  AIPAC (a pro-Israel American political group) lobbied the U.S. congress 
to vote “yes” on authorizing a Syria strike in an effort to protect Israel. Israelis responded 
to this negatively, preferring to focus on Iran as a threat and not to involve themselves 
explicitly in any U.S. military action.47 Netanyahu asked his cabinet to withhold any 
opinion about the possibility of a U.S. strike from the media. Ten days later, Israel 
conducted airstrikes against an Assad base in an effort to prevent Hezbollah from 
receiving weapons from the Syrian military.48 The airstrikes were carried out with 
aircraft purchased from the U.S. government, and upon the release of the story the U.S. 
agreed to sell more of the vehicles to Israel.49 
Before Israel’s airstrikes, an official in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard threatened to 
counter any U.S. or Middle Eastern attack on Syria with the destruction of Israel in 
cooperation with Hezbollah.50 Young Iranian militia members petitioned the Iraqi 
government to allow them to respond to the Israeli border in case of attack, and senior 
Iranian officials debated sending preemptive missile attacks into Israel. The state-run 
news service in Tehran reported all of this, but no actual action was taken. 
Syrian War in Brief 
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Saudi Arabia conducted a paramilitary operation and distanced itself from the 
U.S. Israel- conducted a military strike against an Assad base. However, the action did 
result in a military contract with the U.S. 
Though Iran threatened to strike against a possible Israeli attack, they did not 
follow through after the Israeli airstrike against Assad. Iraq did not allow Iranian militia 
to respond to the border, but Iran made no obvious attempt to circumvent that.  
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IRAN’S NEW DIPLOMACY 
 
 Iran’s apparent change of policy towards the West began in late August, when the 
chief intelligence minister invited opposition activists (who in 2009 protested the result of 
the contested re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) to return to Iran under his 
ministry’s guarantee of safety.51 In a country dominated in the past fifty years by 
autocratic regimes that limit seditious speech as much as possible, that was a huge 
change. 
Rouhani’s UN speech in September 2013 was the culmination of the diplomatic 
changes that began with the appointing of a new Iranian cabinet the previous month. 
President Rouhani said before his UN speech in September 2013, "The world should use 
the opportunity that the Iranian nation has provided through the election.”52 He then 
followed that up with a personal phone call to President Obama. This was the first time 
that the presidents of Iran and the U.S. spoke since the late 1970’s. Rouhani’s main 
objectives in the talks were to address the sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and to 
reconnect an isolated, financially struggling Iran with the rest of the world. 
The objectives of much of Iranian government, however, remain unclear. The 
dismal media access to internal Iranian politics makes it difficult to analyze the domestic 
political situation that allowed this to happen. Some of the collected data, however, sheds 
some light into Tehran. 
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Israel rejected and opposed Iran’s UN outreach. Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu warned that Israel would use any level of force, unilaterally if necessary, to 
prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. He insisted that Iran’s promise not to 
develop such weapons was a lie, and even said that Iran had been planning to attack the 
US embassy in Tel Aviv. The Wall Street Journal quoted a White House official as 
saying, “We are aware that Israel has detained an alleged Iranian spy," as explanation for 
where those accusations may have come from.53 
Saudi Arabian foreign policymakers were already disenchanted with U.S. 
diplomacy before Rouhani’s speech because of the administration’s apparent change of 
position on ousting Assad. When the international community saw what appeared to be 
U.S. support of Iran’s political goals, Saudi Arabian-U.S. relations worsened 
considerably.54 While its economic dependency on the U.S. put some limits on how far it 
was willing to draw away from the West, Saudi Arabia seemed to prioritize keeping any 
U.S.-Iran deal off the table. 
Saudi Arabia made a public display of increasing their closeness to France as an 
option to replace their ties with America. Meanwhile, other gulf states such as Oman 
distanced themselves from Saudi Arabia,55 rather than from the U.S. Intelligence chief 
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Prince Bandar again made critical public comments about U.S. foreign policy that would 
later contribute to the loss of his position.56 
There was even some conjecture that Saudi Arabia and Israel may establish a 
relationship during this period over the mutual enemy found in Iran. At the end of the 
data collection period, however, Saudi Arabia had still never formally recognized the 
state of Israel. 
 
In Brief 
Israel allegedly detained an Iranian spy and used his or her words to inform at 
least part of their policy. Netanyahu’s public UN position was very firmly against any 
accommodation of Iran. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran were recorded using only diplomatic resources in actions 
directly related to this event. Saudi Arabia used public diplomacy in a negative sense; 
that is, to discourage diplomatic intercourse, whereas Iran sought to encourage it for its 
own benefit. 
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THE GAZA WAR 
 
 Tensions between Israel and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip gradually built up in 
the months leading to the summer of 2014. In November 2013, Israeli settlements and 
housing projects were planned but canceled because of the international backlash.57 In 
January, Iran-backed Hezbollah caused Israel to upgrade its missile threat level.58 In 
March 2014, Israeli forces intercepted a shipment of rockets allegedly sent by Iran to 
Gaza59. Later that month, Israel refused to free the 26 Palestinian prisoners whom they 
had agreed to free as part of previous peace agreements. 60 
 In June, the alleged kidnappings of three Israeli teenagers embroiled the two 
governments in a confrontation.61 Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas publicly 
condemned the kidnappers and blamed Hamas, saying that they had destroyed the 
political negotiating power of his administration. The Israeli government responded with 
military raids into Gaza. Hamas responded with rocket attacks, and Israel deployed its 
own rockets. 
 The death toll rose as these attacks continued from both sides almost daily until 
the end of the data collection period in August. Though several short cease-fires that were 
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brokered by Egypt and the U.S. lasted a few days, they were all eventually broken. 
Hamas fired first, ending every negotiated pause. 
 Iran’s religious leadership called for all Muslims to support Palestinians in Gaza. 
Ayatollah Khameini called for arming Hamas to fight Israel.62 However, no data or 
reliable mention could be found of Iran itself openly sending money or weapons to Gaza 
during the conflict.  
 Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah condemned the war as a tragedy, calling it a 
“collective massacre.” He did not, however, blame either side for the conflict directly. In 
previous clashes with Gaza, he had condemned Israel for its part in it, but in summer 
2014 he only blamed “various forms of terrorism.”63 
In Brief 
 Israel’s actions included paramilitary strikes, diplomatic posturing, and eventually 
military invasion. 
Iran and Saudi Arabia used political posturing to varying degrees of severity. 
Neither engaged in any concrete action against Israel. 
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THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
 
 In late 2013, the political situation of Iraq began to destabilize. Sunni protests 
against the Iraqi government had President al-Maliki of Iraq asking for international help 
before the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant even became a major force. Political 
analysts and media outlets have discussed greatly the use of the word “Islamic” when 
referring to this militant group. “Islamic State” and the abbreviation “ISIL” are used here 
in imitation of AP style and the pattern by U.S. policymakers to avoid confusion; it is not 
intended as an analysis of this issue. 
 Saudi Arabia and Iran were involved in the rise of ISIL from the beginning.64 
Saudi Arabia backed Syrian rebels against Assad’s forces in Syria, and Iran backed the 
Assad regime. The Saudi-backed rebels were losing in Syria, but Tehran’s influence in 
Baghdad was weakened by the ISIL threat. Saudi Arabia decided to back ISIL in its 
takeover of the Iranian-backed Al-Maliki government in Iraq. Saudi intelligence officers 
made it clear that Riyadh would stop short of helping ISIL capture Kurdish territory, and 
directed the militants toward Baghdad instead. Later, Riyadh policymakers argued that 
the turmoil and ISIL threat were due to Tehran’s meddling in Iraqi affairs.65 
 As Iran was trying to boost its relationship with the U.S., its hold on Iraq was 
slipping. They used the opportunity to show that they were on the side of the conflict that 
did not support the group and its horrific acts. As the violence and taped beheadings 
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gained media attention, the U.S. began to take on an active role in fighting ISIL. This 
placed Iran, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and pretty much everyone in the world on the same 
side. Speculation existed of a U.S.-Iran collaborative military effort, which did not 
happen. Saudi-Iranian cooperation was made impossible because each blamed the other 
for allowing the crisis to begin. 
Israel was relatively silent in the first few months of ISIL’s growing threat, 
preferring to allow groups that it considered dangerous to weaken each other before 
intervening. This tactic has been referred to as the “plague on both your houses” policy.66 
After the data collection period, they began collaborating with Egypt on air strikes 
against ISIL. Egyptians publicly denied that these strikes occurred, and Israeli 
policymakers would neither confirm them nor deny them. 
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ANALYSIS 
 
SAUDI ARABIA 
 
For Saudi Arabia, the paramilitary operations in the Syrian Civil War were the 
beginning of a shift in diplomatic approach to the West as well as an indicator of the way 
that they would conduct intelligence operations. Its interest in overthrowing the 
administration of Bashar al-Assad is largely influenced by historical conflict. Saudi 
Arabia has had poor relations with Syria historically, in large part because of their 
dealings with Iran: Syria has been a source of missile technology since Iran was cut off 
from American technology. Since 2005, the relationship has been openly confrontational 
because Saudi Arabia blames Assad for the assassination of pro-Saudi Prime Minister of 
Lebanon Rafic Hariri.67Saudi bad blood with Iran goes back to the early Cold War, and is 
rooted largely in regional competition for power, though the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
highlighted the sectarian differences in the religious identity of the two nations.68  
Though Iran is not a large exporter of oil on the Saudi Arabian scale, it may pose 
a threat to Saudi Arabia’s position of power in the Gulf. Nations like Oman and the 
Emirates, for example, are influenced by the wealthy Saudi monarchy. If Iran returns to 
the influence it had before the revolution of 1979, the competition may weaken Saudi 
power in the Gulf. Iran may pose a national security problem, as well, especially if it 
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develops a nuclear weapons program. Saudi Arabia found itself on the same side of the 
debate as Israel, but could not partner with them for similar reasons that it opposes Iran. 
The majority of Arab states does not recognize Israel’s sovereignty and opposes its very 
existence.  Saudi Arabia is trying to gain and maintain a position of leadership among 
Arab states. Acknowledging that it shares common ground with Israel, even to oppose 
Iran, would have caused major political fallout in the Gulf. 
This background explains Saudi Arabia’s response to the U.S. when it pulled 
away from its initial involvement in Syria. Saudi policymakers may have seen a lack of 
commitment in Syria by the Obama administration, followed by a willingness to discuss a 
nuclear deal with Iran, as a major threat to its position and security. If the U.S. begins to 
value Iranian friendship as highly as it does its relationship with Saudi Arabia, it would 
be bad news for Iran. Prince Bandar’s response was ire; he publicly denounced the 
actions and positions of the Obama administration. For this, he was called a “hothead” by 
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and distanced from King Abdullah and from the 
intelligence community. Bandar eventually lost his job. Saudi Arabia relies on the U.S. as 
a principal buyer in its oil market and as a source of military technology and support. 69  
Though it has economic reasons to get closer to the U.S. instead of further away, Bandar 
valued those economic concerns below the influence of recent conflicts in making this 
decision. The rest of Riyadh did not seem to approve of this prioritization of influences. 
Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah avoided taking a strong position against Israel 
during the Gaza War. This decision is very telling, especially considering their 
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aspirations for power among Arab states. Arab nations that do not recognize Israel tend to 
support Palestine as the rightful owner of the territory occupied by Israel. However, very 
few nations financially or militarily help Palestine, especially in recent conflicts.70 
Saudi Arabia in particular has taken a moderate stance on Palestine in recent 
years. In 2002, and again in 2007, King Abdullah presented the Arab Peace Initiative, 
which proposes recognizing the 1967 borders, which do not include the territory Israel 
has gained since then, such as the Golan Heights, in exchange for normalization of 
relations with Israel. If Saudi Arabia has decided to keep Palestine and Israel at an equal 
distance, their careful reaction to the Gaza War makes sense. 
Riyadh, and specifically Saudi Arabian intelligence, supported ISIL in its infancy. 
In an effort to undermine al-Maliki and Iran by extension, they backed the extremist 
Sunni group. The Sunni-Shia divide was likely a major contributing factor, but the effort 
to attack Iranian influence was at the core of their initial pro-ISIL decision. Later, when 
the international community learned of ISIL’s atrocities, the militants lost all Saudi 
support. The Saudi government blamed Iran for the problem because of its support of al-
Maliki. Iranian meddling in Iraq, according to Saudi Arabia, caused the turmoil that 
allowed ISIL to form in the first place. 
Many Saudi foreign policy actions stem from a need to posture themselves in a 
politically advantageous way. Because they seek to hold influence over other Arab 
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nations in the Gulf, they need to appear to be the great Arab leaders. Their distrust and 
hostility towards Iran stems from both this competitive desire and from the sectarian 
differences in their populations; the Saudi monarchy is under pressure to be Sunni leaders 
as well as Arab. Internationally, Sunni Islam is more common than Shia, so this is an 
advantageous position as well. 
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ISRAEL 
There are definitely economic benefits to Israel’s course of action in the Syrian 
civil war. By acting parallel to President Obama’s desire to intervene in Syria, they 
secured a military contract between the two countries, in which Israel was able to 
purchase American military aircraft. However, this was likely not the most important 
reason for the decision. Especially interesting is that the top Israeli policymakers were 
silent about the attack until it happened. That may mean that the action was less about 
posturing and appearing to take this course of action for all to see, and more about what 
was actually done. Much of Israel’s reasoning behind the attack was probably for 
immediate national security alone; Syria is a nearby state in chaos, and the possibility of 
chemical weapons has practical implications for Israeli safety. 
Though there was international conjecture at the time that Israel may partner with 
Saudi Arabia to intervene in Syria, it never happened. When the US drew back from 
involvement in Syria, Israel and Saudi Arabia both had an interest in remaining involved 
in the conflict, but they never were reported cooperating publicly. Israel’s lack of public 
partnership with Saudi Arabia is largely due to Saudi Arabia’s decision so far not to 
acknowledge Israel’s sovereignty. Intrinsic in this lack of public acknowledgement is the 
icy nature of Israeli and Saudi Arabian relations. 
However, Israel striking against Assad on its own had political rewards. Israel 
would benefit from a less hostile administration in Syria. If the rebels overthrew Assad 
with Israeli help, this would be a more likely outcome. Saudi Arabia had already been 
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involved with rebel aid, and Israel may have wanted a part of that arrangement after the 
violence ends. 
Israel’s capturing of alleged Iranian personnel during Rouhani’s UN outreach 
certainly isn’t out of character for the Mossad. In this case, Mossad intelligence directly 
fed into the Prime Minister’s UN speech, and that is very telling about how Israeli foreign 
policymakers treat their intelligence community. This connection between Netanyahu’s 
speech and Israel’s intelligence activities suggests that the Mossad is seen as part of 
Israeli foreign policy, not part of the military or an extension of the executive offices.  
Israel’s waging of the Gaza War was largely about national security and logistical 
advantages of changing territorial boundaries. Tel Aviv didn’t seem to prioritize public 
relations or diplomacy with third parties nearly as much as they did conducting the raids 
and missiles. Netanyahu made several media appearances in English and was quoted by 
Associated Press saying as much: 
“Every Palestinian civilian's death costs Israel in its fight for world opinion, but 
the Jewish state must not cede its security for the sake of public relations, Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said as he pressed his nation's case on America's Sunday 
news programs.”71  
Israel’s actions against ISIL came about the same time as the reactions in the 
international community. They were secretive about their strikes in cooperation with 
Egypt, though they had nothing to lose politically by doing so publicly. Their actions in 
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Syria and in the Gaza War, similarly, were largely kept secret until after the fact. This 
and the direct quotes from Netanyahu suggest that political posturing is not a priority for 
Israeli foreign policy as it is for Saudi Arabia. Rather, Cold War and recent history 
informs the Israeli perception of national security threats Israel’s identity as the Jewish 
homeland may be a factor in the decision-making processes of its foreign policymakers, 
but the highest priority in Israeli relations seems to be national security. Economic 
concerns tie into national security as well, especially where the ability to trade military 
technology with the US is concerned.  
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IRAN 
Iran’s hostility towards Israel in the wake of the Syrian civil war is no surprise. 
Iran has had no warm relations with Israel since its founding in the early Cold War, but 
the religious conservative element in Iran since the revolution of 1979 is even less 
tolerant of the Israeli state. The discord has its roots not only in religious differences with 
the Jewish state, but a history of European and American interference in the Middle East 
to Iran’s disadvantage, such as in Operation Ajax. Iran has, however, had good relations 
with Syria since its cooperation with Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War. 
Iran did not send preemptive attacks into Israel as it had threatened to do, nor did 
they follow through with their threat after Israel attacked. The militia was not allowed to 
go near the Israeli border, and no Iranian missiles were launched at Israel. This may have 
been due to a lack of genuine hostility or desire to attack, but it is likely a measured 
weighing of the consequences of such an action. Iran had just inducted 15 new members 
to its cabinet of senior policymakers,72 many of them moderates who saw the economic 
and political gains of less hostile situation with the West. Perhaps, if they wanted to avoid 
hostility, the new president and cabinet members simply wanted to avoid the Ayatollah’s 
threatened violence. The troop movements that did take place may have been posturing 
alone, done entirely for the benefit of their allies so Iran would not appear to have 
changed its policies too drastically or to lack follow-through on its public stances. 
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Rouhani lost some domestic popularity in his overtures to the UN.73 He was seen 
by the conservatives in Iran as pandering to Iran’s enemies who had colonized and taken 
advantage of Iran in the past. Rouhani’s decisions were based largely on economics. The 
religious clerics and leaders of the Revolutionary Guard who hold immense power, 
however, were probably influenced by all of the bad experiences with the West that Iran 
has had, both in the early Cold War and during Iran’s revolution.74 The conservative, 
religiously based powers in Tehran seem at odds with the newly elected officials as far as 
what is most important to them; the new cabinet wants to rejuvenate the economy with 
the aid of Western allies, and the clerics and revolutionary guard want to protect Iran 
from further abuse at the hands of powerful enemies. 
In the past, the Revolutionary Guard has held arguably more power than the 
president, and has used the presidency as its platform to exert power.75 This disagreement 
between the two offices may signal a move in Tehran towards freer elections, or at least a 
less monolithic government; if the guard had been able to control the election, they would 
now control the presidency. Rouhani’s moderate policies are apparently popular among 
Iranians who are struggling in the slow economy, but support for his policies is not 
universal. He was elected without the influence of the conservative clerics. However, it is 
unlikely that Rouhani would ever have been able to appear before the UN without the 
blessing of the Supreme Leader of Iran. From the beginning of the negotiations, the 
international community predicted that much of Iran’s desire for a new state of affairs 
with the U.S. could be attributed to their desire for nuclear weapons. Current sanctions 
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against Iran prevent its development of nuclear technology. It is possible that Rouhani’s 
desire for easier relations with the West were for economic reasons, but the religious 
clerics allowed him to reach out to the UN in order to eventually gain nuclear weapons. 
Their two desires dovetailed into the change of policy seen during the data collection 
period. 
Iran did not gain anything from the rise of ISIL in the way that Saudi Arabia did 
during the group’s infancy: it already had significant influence over Iraq under al-
Maliki’s campaign. This is largely due to the influence of the Ayatollah over the 
significant Shia population of Iraq. Iran’s use of diplomacy with the U.S. since Rouhani’s 
election is very different from its Cold War public relations, and we can see this clearly 
in their handling of the ISIL threat. Iran publicly denounced ISIL, and may have sought 
to strengthen their new ties to the US by cooperating militarily to strike against their 
territory in Iraq.76 Though this was not reported to have happened, it would have been 
helpful to Iran’s nuclear incentives. 
Rouhani’s foreign policy decisions for Iran were largely based on economics. 
Rouhani has a base of support in Iran largely made up of people who want economic 
prosperity instead of the religious isolation that it has seen since the 1979 revolution. 
Rouhani reflects these priorities in his foreign policy. The nuclear incentives of Iran are 
also present and important, especially for the religious clerics, but also for Rouhani, who 
may see them as a way to gain political clout, economic opportunity, and national 
security. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
At the beginning of this study, there was no guarantee that anything of importance 
would happen within the 13-month data collection period that would be conducive to the 
analytical framework I had planned. However, the Middle East couldn’t stay quiet for a 
whole year. Scholars and journalists looking to explore the new administrations or 
policies of nations could definitely repeat this study in the future. The historically based 
part of the analysis, for example, will only get richer with repetition as history is made. 
Though different yearlong periods may be just as fruitful as the one I chose for my study, 
this study could also be repeated with smaller periods of time in order to focus on a 
specific event, or on a specific possible causation for analysis. 
The purpose of the study was to contribute to the scholarly understanding of the 
foreign policies of Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Hopefully, this thesis will also 
contribute to a public understanding of Middle Eastern cultures. The socioeconomic and 
political causations behind the data collected are unique to the region and the nations that 
make it up, and the methodology of this analysis revealed that.  
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